Thursday, 1 January 2015

Herald’s Person of the Year: Aitzaz Hasan

Aitzaz Hasan in an image distributed on social media


SIXTEEN-year-old Aitzaz Hasan, killed while averting a suicide attack on his school in Hangu in January last year, has been chosen as Herald’s Person of the Year for 2014.

Herald’s annual Person of the Year project sets out to recognize those individuals in Pakistan who had a profound influence on the news and who embodied, for good or ill, what was important about the year.

Hasan, whose sacrifice attained further poignancy after the December 16 attack on Peshawar Army Public School, emerged as the winner in a three-way voting process that included online voting, postal ballots and input from a panel of 10 eminent Pakistanis.

In the final cumulative result, Hasan received 24.1 per cent of the votes, closely followed by Imran Khan, who received 23.3 per cent and who was included on the list for “creating the biggest political storm of the year”.

Other candidates in the running were lawyer Rashid Rehman, gunned down last year for defending a blasphemy accused; the Lyari footballers, who placed third in the Street Child World Cup; Mama Qadeer, leading campaigner for the return of the missing Baloch; child activist and Nobel Prize winner Malala Yousafzai; television talk-show host Hamid Mir; chief of army staff General Raheel Sharif; cricketer Younis Khan, and, collectively, all local directors who debuted films this year.

In Herald’s upcoming annual issue, Yousafzai – Herald’s Person of the Year for 2012 – pays tribute to Hasan, writing:

“Our country is blessed with brave people. The story of Aitzaz Hasan reflects their reliance, courage and bravery.”

Say hello to iJihad - Mujahid Online

In the not so distant future, the fight to win over Muslims will move from battle and oil fields to digital domains. —AP

Not to be outdone by the rest in the Internet age, the Jihadists have readily embraced modern communication technologies. From their recruitment videos on YouTube to timely tweets of their vicious attacks on civilians, the Jihadists are out and about preaching online to whoever is willing to listen to their diatribe.

It started earlier with the video recorders, when the militants recorded their attacks and sent the videos to the news media. Hezbollah of Lebanon was among the first to use videos of their attacks as a propaganda tool. The advent of YouTube made the task even simpler: kill, record, and upload. is it sound funny ??

The emergence of Web 2.0 technologies has transformed the way individuals, corporations, and governments communicate, using social media. The jihadists of today are unlike those of yester years who shunned all things western.

To the older generations, TV was an evil box. To the modern-day Jihadists, Facebook and Twitter are godsend. Even IS has launched an Arabic language Twitter app (The Dawn of Glad Tidings) to recruit and raise funds.

The Jihadists do share common traits with others in the way they use the Internet to recruit. They use social media to communicate with like-minded individuals and keep them abreast of their activities. Tweeting about their latest exploits or Facebook status updates about attacks in the semi-rural hinterlands of hard-to-reach places, which are yet to be profiled by Google street maps, keep the propaganda engine churning.
However, that’s where the similarities end.

The Jihadists rely on the word-of-mouth approach by placing their content in cyberspace. They have not been able to take out online Ads to target their message at the intended. It is highly unlikely that Google Ads will carry messages for IS or Boko Haram. Instead, the reverse is true. Jihadists social media accounts are routinely suspended by the companies and ISP providers refuse to host their online content. The Jihadists then have learned to operate within the limits to avoid a clampdown on their recognised Internet outlets.

From Alim online to Mujahid online

TV evangelism morphed earlier into digital evangelism. The Jihadists have taken this a step further. They use the social media to field questions from wannabe jihadists.

A European Jihadi wannabe asked an Internet-savvy Jihadist about the quality of dental care in Syria. The aspiring Jihadi was concerned about his braces. Another inquired about the general quality of healthcare. Yet another westerner was concerned about the availability of central heating in Syria and Iraq.

While the Jihadist’s use of social media often provides comic relief, it is also successful in converting young westerners to extremist ideologies. The Great Recession of 2007/08 had a devastating impact on European economies. The youth unemployment rate spiked as a result.

Unemployed rebels without a cause think they can find a purpose in the battlefields of Syria and Iraq. Even young western women are lured by the Jihadist videos some of whom have left for the Middle East to become Jihadi wives.

Better online than offline

Many view the Jihadists use of the Internet to communicate and propagate as a blatant abuse of the public good, the Internet.

Some call for strict restrictions on the Jihadists’ online activities. The Jihadist propaganda invokes centuries-old imagery and reminisces about establishing a caliphate, returning to a barter economy with gold reserves, and uses swords and knives for beheadings.

Given their nostalgic outlook on life and values, many find it odd that the Jihadists have so eagerly adopted the modern ways of communication and warfare. The Internet, automatic weapons, dual cabin vehicles are all products of modern society, which the Jihadists violently oppose and yet, willingly adopt its products at the same time.

The call to push Jihadists off the information highway is understandable, but not useful. The fact that the Jihadists use mobile phones and Internet technologies is extremely helpful in tracking and monitoring their activities.

Given that only a handful of super highways exist through which all digital communications passes, it is quite possible to put in place surveillance systems to monitor chatter and apply filters to the noisy data to determine what is being said or planned.

Most breakthroughs in capturing or terminating violent militants happened either by sheer luck or by effective monitoring of digital communications.


While sophisticated algorithms and access to main Internet switches, through which the digital communications pass through, will be highly useful, still anyone with an Internet connection can peek into what is happening in the Jihadi blogosphere.

The recent rise of  IS and its leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who fancies expensive watches, can be tracked over time by monitoring the Google searches using Google trends. While Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi surfaced only recently, the Google-based searches for ‘caliphate’ peaked earlier in February 2011.

Globally, Nigeria and Pakistan are the two places where the search for ‘caliphate’ represents the highest share of the Google searches.

Pakistan ranks at the top for searches for ‘abu bakr’. Within Pakistan, Faisalabad reported the highest concentration of searches for “abu bakr.


Imagine the kind of intelligence one can collect if the same searches are conducted by individual IP addresses and then aggregated over time and space to determine the contexts in which various dialogues and exchanges take place on social media.

The academics specialising in privacy will be mortified to read these arguments. The challenge, in fact is to balance the need for intelligence against the individual’s right to privacy. It is easier said than done, especially when the militant Jihadists do not play by any rulebook.

In the not so distant future, the fight to win over Muslims will move from battle and oil fields to digital domains.

Those with aspirations for becoming a global caliph will be busy amassing Facebook friends and Twitter followers. A self-professed caliph near the border of Syria and Iraq and a self-proclaimed Ameer-ul-Momineen in the Pashtun dominated areas of Afghanistan will be the first to compete for a larger number of online followers.

It does not matter how unsocial one may be, social media, at least for now, is serving the communication needs of Jihadists and other extremists.

As the technology continues to evolve, one hopes that the Web 3.0 tools will arrive with automated filters to expose bigots and to make it harder to exploit the naivety of the youth.

Abul Ala Maududi: An Existentialist History

Abul Ala Maududi

To most Pakistanis and to those who have been associated with various Islamic political outfits in countries like Egypt, Indonesia, Syria and Malaysia, Abul Ala Maududi is to 'Political Islam' what Karl Marx was to Communism.

Both western and South Asian historians have described him as one of the most powerful Islamic ideologues of the 20th century, whose ideas and writings went on to influence a vast number of Islamic movements in the Muslim world.

For example, the well-known American journal, The New Statesman, in its July 2013 issue, suggested that the impact of Maududi's ideas can be found in modern Islamic movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood (first formed in Egypt) and similar outfits across the Muslim realms, all the way to the more aggressive postures of men like Osama Bin Laden, the founder of Al Qaeda and once the most wanted terrorist in the world.

Ambitions and Achievements


In Pakistan, Maududi is mostly remembered as an Islamic scholar who founded the Jamaat-i-Islami (JI). But he also still remains a controversial figure here. To the left and liberal segments, he is remembered as the man who let the US use JI (during the Cold War) to undermine leftist and progressive politics in Pakistan,

whereas many Islamic parties opposed to the JI once went on to declare him to be a religious innovator who attempted to create a whole new sect.

He arrived in Pakistan from India as a migrant and scholar with the ambition to turn what to him was a nationalistic abomination into becoming a 'true Islamic state' based on the laws of the shariah.

Maududi had formed his party in 1941 like a Leninist outfit in which a vanguard and select group of learned and 'pious Muslims' would work to bring an 'Islamic revolution' and do away with the forces of what Maududi called modern-day jahiliya (socialism, communism, liberal democracy, secularism and a faith 'distorted by innovators').

To that end, he began to lay down the foundations of what came to be known as 'Islamism' — a theory that advocated the formation of an Islamic state by first 'Islamising' various sections of the economy and politics so that a fully Islamised polity could be built to launch the final Islamic revolution.

Maududi's theories in this context attracted certain segments of Pakistan's urban middle-classes and was also adopted by Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood, which tried to jettison the process through a 'jihad' within Egypt.

Not only did Maududi and his party face resistance from leftist groups, it also entered into a long tussle with Ayub Khan's secular/modernist dictatorship (1958-69), and with the ZA Bhutto regime, which was based on populist socialism (1971-77).

Maududi was also taken to task by the Jamiat Ulema-i-Pakistan, which accused the JI of creating a separate Muslim sect called 'Maududiat'.

Nevertheless, Maududi's ideas were eventually adopted by General Ziaul Haq, who had pulled off a successful military coup in July 1977 and then invited Maududi to help him shape policies to help make Pakistan a 'true Islamic country' run on 'Nizam-e-Mustafa.'

The course charted by Zia eventually mutated into becoming a destructive and highly polarising legacy that the state, politics and society of Pakistan has been battling with till this day.

But the irony is that none of what went down in the name of faith and 'Islamisation' during and after the Zia dictatorship was witnessed by the ideologue who had first inspired it, because Maududi passed away in 1979.

Not an all-out conservative — Maududi's existential journey


In all the noise that Maududi's career as a scholar, ideologue and politician generated, what got lost was the crucial fact that unlike most of today's Islamic scholars and leaders, Maududi did not emerge from an entirely conservative background.

His personal history is a rather fascinating story of a man who, after suffering from spats of existential crises, chose to interpret Islam as a political theory to address his own dilemmas.

He did not come raging out of a madressah, swinging a fist at the vulgarities of the modern world. On the contrary, he was born into a family in the town of Auranganad in colonial India that had relations with the modern and enlightened Muslim scholar, Sir Syed Ahmed Khan.

Syed Ahmed Khan was one of the earliest architects of Muslim Nationalism in India — a nationalism that attempted to create a robust Muslim middle-class in India that was well-versed in the sciences, arts and politics of Europe, as well as in the more rational and progressive understanding of Islam. It was for this very purpose that he formed the MAO college (later known as Aligarh University).

The Aligarh University that was formed by Sir Syed Ahmed Khan to modernise Muslim education in India.


Syed Ahmed convinced Maududi's father, Ahmed Hassan, to join the college against the wishes of Maududi's conservative paternal grandfather.

Incensed by the fact that his son had begun to wear 'Western clothes' and play cricket, Hassan's father pulled him out of the college and got him lectured by various clerics and ulema on how he was going against his faith by 'being overwhelmed by western lifestyle.'

Hassan soon renounced everything that had attracted him at the college and became extremely conservative and religious. When Maududi was born (1903), Hassan pledged not to give his son a western education.
So Maududi received his early education at home through private tutors who taught him the Quran, Hadith, Arabic and Persian. At age 12 Maududi, was sent to the Oriental High School whose curriculum had been designed by famous Islamic scholar, Shibli Nomani.

Apart from teaching Islamic law and tradition to the students, the school also taught Mathematics and English. Maududi then moved to an Islamic college, Darul Aloom, in Hyderabad. But he had to cut short his college education when his father fell sick and he had to travel to Bhopal to visit him. In Bhopal, the young Maududi befriended Urdu poet and writer, Niaz Fatehpuri.

Fatehpuri's writings and poetry were highly critical of conservative Muslims and the orthodox Muslim clergy, and on a number of occasions, various ulema had declared him to be a 'heretic.' But Fatehpuri soldiered on and had already begun to make a name for himself in Urdu literary circles when he met Maududi.

Inspired by Fatehpuri's writing style, Maududi too decided to become a writer. In 1919, the then 17-year-old Maududi moved to Delhi, where for the first time he began to study the works of Syed Ahmed Khan in full. This led to the study of major works of philosophy, sociology, history and politics by leading European thinkers and writers.

Maududi is said to have spent about five years reading books and essays authored by famous European philosophers, political scientists and historians, and he emerged from this vigorous exercise a man who claimed to have found the reason behind the rise of the West (and the fall of Muslim empires).

By now, he had also begun to write columns for Urdu newspapers. In one of his articles, he listed the names of those European scholars whose works and ideas, according to him, had shaped the rise of Western civilisation. The scholars that he mentioned in his list included Russian materialist philosopher, Hegel; British economist, Adam Smith; revolutionary French writers, Rousseau and Voltaire; pioneering evolutionist and biologist, Charles Darwin and many others.

With this article, he began to shape a narrative through his columns in which he emphasised the need (for Muslims) to study and understand Western political thought and philosophy and to 'master their sciences.' He said that one could not challenge anything that one did not understand.
 
It was also during this period that Maududi began to exhibit an interest in Marxism. At age 25, he became an admirer of the time's leading Marxist intellectual in India, Abdul Sattar Khairi, and then befriended famous progressive Urdu poet, Josh Malihabadi.

The young Maududi (1927)



 By the early 1930s, Maududi was living the life of a studious young man and journalist who also enjoyed watching films in the newly emerging cinemas of India and listening to songs. He married an independent-minded girl, Mehmuda, who was educated at a missionary school in Delhi, wore modern dresses and owned her own bicycle! There was no bar on her to wear a burqa.



 Despite all this, Maududi did retain some link with his past as the son of a very conservative man. In his quest to revive the lost tradition of Muslim intellectualism, he had also come close to India's main party of Sunni Deobandi Muslims, the Jamiat Ulema-i-Hind (JUH).

But at the same time, he also expressed admiration for the political and spiritual leader, Mahatma Gandhi. Though he never joined Gandhi's Indian National Congress (INC) himself, he did urge other Muslims to join it in his articles. He also authored biographies of Gandhi and another Congress ideologue, Pundit Malaviya.
Maududi was greatly dismayed by the breakup of the Ottoman Empire in Turkey, and he blamed Turkish nationalists for it. When INC began to talk about an 'Indian Nationalism', something snapped in Maududi.

He had devoured every book on Western philosophy and history, but when the Ottoman Empire collapsed at the hands of Turkish nationalists, Maududi realised he had been highly underrating the power of modern nationalism all this time. This was one European concept he was not too familiar with.

Disenchanted by the Congress' Indian Nationalism and JUH's alliance with the party, Maududi retreated to the life of a husband who spent most of his time with his family, books, the occasional film and classical and semi-classical songs performed on stage.

 In 1938, he bumped into Manzoor Nomani, a prominent Islamic scholar, who admonished him for distancing himself from his father's legacy, for not having a beard and living the life of a rudderless Muslim.

Already disappointed with the way the concept of nationalism was taking root in the minds of the Hindus and Muslims of India, Maududi retired back to his library, but this time to study Islam.

He now emerged with the theory that it wasn't really the greatness of modern Western thought that had been entirely responsible for the rise of European political power, but it was due to lack of conviction of the Muslims to practice their faith in the right manner that had triggered their fall and made room for European powers to enter.


 In 1937, he vehemently attacked the INC's nationalism, accusing it of trying to subjugate the Muslims of India, but by the early 1940s he was being equally critical of Jinnah's All India Muslim League and of Muslim Nationalism.

He declared the League to be 'a party of pagans' and 'nominal Muslims' who wanted to create a secular country in the name of Pakistan.

Maududi's vehement attacks could not stop the sudden momentum that the League gained in 1946 and that helped it form an independent Muslim country in 1947.

In another ironic move, Maududi decided to leave India and head for a country that to him was an abomination and abode of nominal Muslims and the jahiliya. He began his political career in Pakistan in 1949, and it lasted on till 1979, when he passed away from illness in a US hospital. His funeral in Lahore was attended by thousands of admirers.

The many Maududis


Writing in the 'Princeton Encyclopedia of Islamic Political Thought', Irfan Ahmed suggests that there was not one Maududi but many.

By this, he meant that as a scholar and ideologue, Maududi's views were often derivatives of phases in his existential journey; one that saw him depart from the conservatism his father had tried to impose upon him and wholeheartedly embrace the freshness of European philosophical and political thought.

Maududi then bounced between Indian Marxism and the anti-colonial stances of Gandhi and Deobandi ulema (JUH), before settling for a quiet urban middle-class family life. But incensed by the rise of Muslim Nationalism, Maududi finally found his calling in the project of interpreting Islam's holy texts in a political light, and emerging with a complex theory that we now call Political Islam (aka 'Islamism').

Elements of organisational Leninism, Hegel's dualism, Jalaluddin Afghani's Pan-Islamism and various other modern political theories can be found in his innovative thesis, and that's why his thoughts not only managed to appeal to modern conservative Muslim movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood and populist youth outfits such as the Islami Jamiat Taleba, but even the mujahideen who fought Soviet forces in Afghanistan all the way to the more anarchic (if not entirely nihilistic) ways of men such as Osama Bin Laden.

But the question is, had Maududi been alive today, which one of the many Maududis out there would he have been most comfortable with?

Nawaz Calls Parliamentary Leaders To Address Concerns On Military Courts

Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. — AFP/File
ISLAMABAD: Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has called a meeting of parliamentary leaders at the Prime Minister House on Friday (tomorrow) to address concerns that have arisen on the matter of military courts.

The two main opposition parties, Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf (PTI) and Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), which had earlier endorsed the move, have since been having second thoughts to the commitments they had made during the December 24 meeting of parliamentary parties and key stakeholders, including the military's top brass, who were present there.

Earlier, PPP stalwart and Leader of the Opposition in the Senate Aitzaz Ahsan had categorically stated that he had opposed the idea of amending the constitution for establishing military courts which were mentioned in the document made public after the meeting.


However, today, Leader of Opposition in the National Assembly Syed Khurshid Shah refuted that the establishment of military courts was discussed during the Dec 24 meeting.

Shah said that during the meeting, establishment of special courts did come into discussion but not military courts. The political parties were told that special courts would try terrorists and organisations where the terrorists were getting their funding from, he added.

The opposition leader said that the meeting had agreed to form a legal team to keep an eye on the process of the formation and workings of these special courts.

Shah however said that consensus has now been developed on carrying out amendments in the Army Act to pave way for creating special courts.


At present, the army act limits the military’s jurisdiction over civilians to specific cases.

The government’s legal advisers are weighing the option of amending Article 8 (1) and Article 212-A and B of the constitution in order to establish military courts in the country, officials privy to discussions on the issue had told Dawn earlier.

Article 8 is titled ‘Laws inconsistent with or in derogation of Fundamental Rights to be void’, while Article 212 deals with administrative courts and tribunals.

If the amendments are carried out, changes will be made accordingly in the Army Act 1952 to set up special trial courts to try terror suspects. Under the proposed constitutional amendment, the military courts will cease to function after a period of two years.